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It’s Not a Tax (Statutorily), but It Is a Tax (Constitutionally)
By Steve R. Johnson*

O

n June 28, 2012, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision on
the validity of the individual mandate, a
key portion of so-called ObamaCare.
National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct.
2566. The sharply divided Court held
that, constitutionally, Congress does not
have authority to compel persons to
purchase medical insurance but does
have authority to impose a non-coercive
tax on persons who choose not to
purchase such insurance.
Three aspects of NFIB are of principal
significance to tax professionals: (1) its
treatment of the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA),
(2) its discussion of the Taxing Power,
and (3) its preservation of the myriad tax
increases contained in the upheld
legislation. The third of these will present
practical challenges for lawyers and
accountants whose clients have been
putting off preparing for these taxes in
the hope that they would go away
because of Supreme Court action or the
results of the November elections.
Several of them are discussed elsewhere
in this issue of NewsQuarterly. The first
and second are more conceptually meaty
and are discussed below following
background information.

Background
In 2010, Congress radically revised
the structure and delivery of medical care
in the United States through the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, as
amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act. Among
numerous other changes, this legislation
added section 5000A to the Code.
Beginning in 2014, this section requires
non-exempt persons to have medical
insurance or else make a “shared
responsibility payment” along with their
income tax returns each year.

Many suits have been brought
challenging the constitutionality of
various aspects of the legislation. NFIB
resulted in four opinions. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the lead opinion. Justice
Ginsburg, joined in part or whole by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
concurred in part, concurred in the
judgment, and dissented in part. Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
participated in a joint unsigned dissent.
Justice Thomas also penned a separate
dissent to emphasize his position that the
“substantially affects interstate
commerce” prong should be excised from
Commerce Clause analysis.
The opinions addressed five issues. First,
all nine Justices agreed that the AIA did not
prevent the Court from deciding the merits
of the case. Second, five Justices (the Chief
Justice and the four joint dissenters) agreed
that, under the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
cannot compel persons to acquire medical
insurance. Third, five Justices (the Chief
Justice and the four in the Ginsburg opinion)
agreed that the shared responsibility
payment is constitutional under the Taxing
Power. Fourth, seven Justices (the Chief
Justice, the four joint dissenters, and
Justices Breyer and Kagan) agreed that,
under the Spending Power, Congress could
not threaten the states with loss of their
existing Medicaid funding if they decline
to comply with the legislation’s expansion
of Medicaid. Fifth, since they would have
wholly invalidated the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion, the four
joint dissenters went on to consider the
severability issue. Concluding that these
provisions cannot be severed without
fundamentally disturbing the balance
Congress sought to achieve, the joint
dissenters would have invalidated the
entirety of the Patient Protection and
Reconciliation Acts.

AIA
With enumerated statutory exceptions
and very limited judicial exceptions,
section 7421(a) provides that “no suit for
the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall
be maintained in any court by any
person.” Only one lower court had held
that the AIA bans on-the-merits review of
the individual mandate. Liberty Univ. v.
Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011).
Based on the oral argument, many
predicted that Liberty University would be
unanimously reversed, and this prediction
proved correct. The Chief Justice reasoned
that Congress labelled the shared
responsibility payment as a penalty, not a
tax. The label is not controlling for
constitutional purposes, but it is for
statutory purposes. 132 S. Ct. at 2583
(the AIA and the 2010 Acts “are creatures
of Congress’s own creation. How they
relate to each other is up to Congress.”).
The Chief Justice also rejected a “more
circuitous” argument for applying the
AIA. Section 5000A(g)(1) states that the
payment “shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as an
assessable penalty under subchapter B
of chapter 68.” In turn, under section
6671(a), assessable penalties “shall be
assessed and collected in the same
manner as taxes.” However, the Chief
Justice viewed section 5000A(g)(1) only
as direction to the Service as to
methodology and procedures it should
apply in collecting the payment, not as a
direction to the courts that they are to
apply the AIA. 132 S. Ct. at 2583–84.
The joint dissent went further. “That
the penalty is to be ‘assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes’
refutes the proposition that it is a tax for
all statutory purposes, including with
respect to the [AIA].” Id. at 2656 n.6
(emphasis in original). The joint dissent
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also argued that, in other places in the
Code, Congress provided both that an
item shall be “assessed and collected” in
the same manner as a tax and that suits
to restrain assessment and collection are
prohibited. “The latter directive would be
superfluous if the former invoked the
[AIA].” Id. (citing sections 7421(b)(1),
6901(a) & 6305(a), (b)).
Finally, the Chief Justice rejected a
contention based on section 6201(a),
which authorizes the Service to assess
“all taxes (including interest, additional
amounts, additions to the tax, and
assessable penalties).” From this, it was
argued that the shared responsibility
payment must be a tax because it is an
assessable penalty. The Chief Justice
found this argument forceful “only if
§ 6201(a) is read in isolation” since
“[t]he Code contains many provisions
treating taxes and assessable penalties
as distinct terms.” 132 S. Ct. at 2584
(citing sections 860(h)(1), 6324A(a),
6601(e)(1)–(2), 6671(a) & 7122(b)).
Again, this language was read as
instruction to the Service that it has
assessment authority, not as instruction
to the courts to apply the AIA. The joint
dissent added: “the fact that [assessable
penalties] are included as ‘taxes’ for
purposes of assessment does not
establish that they are included as ‘taxes’
for purposes of other sections …, such
as the [AIA], that do not contain similar
‘including’ language.” Id. at 2656 n.6.
Thus, the AIA does not apply to
pre-enforcement challenges to the
shared responsibility payment.
Theoretically, new challenges against it
could go forward if not barred by res
judicata. However, the AIA still should
apply with respect to the numerous “real
taxes” imposed by the 2010 legislation.

Taxing Power
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the
Constitution sets out both the Taxing
Power and the Spending Power. It
authorizes Congress “[t]o lay and collect
Taxes … to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare

of the United States.” The Chief Justice
conceded that “[t]he most straightforward
reading” is that the individual mandate is
a requirement enforced by a penalty, not
that it is a tax. 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
Nonetheless, he (joined by the four
Justices of the Ginsburg group) upheld
the shared responsibility payment as a
valid exercise of the Taxing Power. The
Chief Justice reasoned as follows. First,
“[t]he text of a statute can sometimes
have more than one possible meaning.”
Id. at 2593. Second, “if a statute has
two possible meanings, one of which
violates the Constitution, courts should
adopt the meaning that does not do so.”
Id. Third, although this is not “the most
natural interpretation of the mandate,”
reading the provision as a tax is one “fairly
possible” rendition of it. Id. at 2594.
To support the “fairly possible”
position, the Chief Justice observed that
the measure possesses “the essential
feature of any tax: it produces at least
some revenue for the Government.” Id.
He also noted particular features of
section 5000A: that the payment is
made to the Treasury, by “taxpayer[s]”
when they file their income tax returns, if
they are required to file; that the amount
of the payment is determined by features
familiar under the income tax; that the
provision is lodged in the Code; and that
it is assessed and collected by the Service
“in the same manner as taxes.” Id.
The joint dissent maintained that the
“fairly possible” principle does not
authorize a court to “rewrite the statute to
be what it is not” and that there was no
way to escape that the individual
mandate involves a penalty, not a tax. Id.
at 2651. The joint dissent advanced a
number of structural features in support
of this proposition, including as “the nail
in the coffin” that the mandate and
payment are in Title I of the Patient
Protection Act, its operative core, not in
Title IX, containing its “Revenue
Provisions.” Id. at 2655. The joint dissent
also noted that 18 times in section
5000A and other parts of the legislation
the measure is called a “penalty.” Id. at
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2653. The dissenters also objected that
the question of whether the tax (if it be
such) was a direct tax requiring
apportionment had been inadequately
briefed and analyzed. Id. at 2655.
Among the key questions resulting
from NFIB is how aggressively Congress
will choose to push its Taxing Power
authority to regulate. NFIB prohibits
Congress from requiring persons to act
under the Commerce Clause, but it
permits Congress to tax persons for not
acting. What, if any, limits are there on
the ability of Congress to regulate
indirectly via the Taxing Power?
On the one hand, the Chief Justice
observed that “[e]very tax is in some
measure regulatory,” id. at 2596
(quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300
U.S. 506, 513 (1937)), and he noted
that “taxes that seek to influence conduct
are nothing new.” 132 S. Ct. at 2596.
On the other hand, the Chief Justice
sought to reassure that “Congress’s ability
to use its taxing power to influence
conduct is not without limits.” Id. at 2599.
At some point, a measure laden with
regulatory and punitive features crosses
out of the “tax” category. The Chief Justice
declined to define that point. It is an open
question whether such definition is
possible via judicially manageable
standards or whether future cases will
have “eye of the beholder” unpredictability.
The closest thing to suggestion of a
limiting principle is the Chief Justice’s
observation that the amount of the shared
responsibility payment “for most Americans
… will be far less than the price of
insurance,” thus that many may rationally
choose to pay the “tax” rather than accede
to Congress’s desire that they buy medical
insurance. Id. at 2595; see also id.
(distinguishing a prior case in part on the
ground that the exaction styled as a tax but
recharacterized by the Court as a penalty
“imposed an exceedingly heavy burden”).
Plainly, however, future cases will have to
wrestle with the extent to which Congress
can achieve indirectly under the Taxing
Power what it cannot achieve directly
under the Commerce Clause. n

